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THE WORK OF THE LOUISIANA APPELLATE
COURTS FOR THE 1978-1979 TERM
A Symposium
[Editor's Note. The articles in this symposium discuss
selected decisions of Louisiana appellate courts reported
in the advance sheets dated July 1, 1978, to July 1, 1979.]
PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE-CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 160
In last year's symposium,1 the author discussed three aspects of
alimony after divorce: (1) the constitutionality of its availability only
to the wife,' (2) when the wife is not at fault,' and (3) when the wife
is without sufficient means' for her support. During the 1979 legisla-
tive session, Civil Code article 160 was amended to make alimony
available to needy husbands, as well as wives.' Such a change is con-
sistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Orr v.
Orr.' At the same time, article 160 was amended to enumerate the
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Per-
sons, 39 LA. L. REV. 657, 659 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Persons].
2. Id.
3. Id at 663.
4. Id. at 670.
5. 1979 La. Acts, No. 72, amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 160.
6. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979). See also Bruner v. Bruner, 373 So. 2d 971 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1979). In Bruner, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal stated:
We hold Orr v. Orr . . . should not be applied retroactively. Consequently,
alimony which accrued prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision will not be af-
fected and this will minimize the hardship caused to those needy former wives
who have made expenditures expecting to accrue past due alimony. Mavis is en-
titled to alimony up to December 14, :978, the date the court of appeal's judgment
holding Mavis' fault precluded her from receiving permanent alimony became
final and definitive. Under these circumstances all alimony to which Mavis was
entitled had accrued before the March 1979 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Orr v.
Orr ....
Id at 978.
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factors to be considered in determining whether the claimant spouse
has insufficient means.'
"Fault" of the claimant spouse remains an absolute bar to a re-
quest for alimony after divorce.' At the 1979 legislative session,
there was a bill introduced9 to eliminate fault as an absolute bar to a
claim for alimony, yet retain consideration of "the relative responsi-
bility of the parties for the breakdown of the marriage" as a rele-
vant factor. The bill was not enacted. To appraise the merits of
eliminating "fault" as an absolute bar, it is necessary to examine
first several of the court of appeal decisions from last year. Through
an analysis of the jurisprudence, it becomes evident that some
courts of appeal decisions cannot withstand scrutiny under the legis-
lation or Louisiana Supreme Court decisions. Furthermore, consider-
ation of complicated fact situations and inconsistent judicial opinions
occupies the energies of our appellate courts solely because fault is
an absolute bar to alimony. Because fault is an absolute bar, it
perhaps incorrectly appears that the judiciary is more concerned
with legal technicalities, rather than providing support for a needy
spouse.
In Brannon v. Brannon"° the wife filed suit for separation from
7. LA. Civ. CODE art. 160, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 72, provides in per-
tinent part:
In determining the entitlement and amount of alimony after divorce, the court
shall consider the income, means, and assets of the spouses; the liquidity of such
assets; the financial obligations of the spouses, including their earning capacity;
the effect of custody of children of the marriage upon the spouse's earning capac-
ity; the time necessary for the recipient to acquire appropriate education, train-
ing, or employment; the health and age of the parties and their obligations to
support or care for dependent children; any other circumstances that the court
deems relevant.
In determining whether the claimant spouse is entitled to alimony, the court
shall consider his or her earning capability, in light of all other circumstances.
The language of article 160 overrules Ward v. Ward, 339 So. 2d 839 (La. 1976), and
Favrot v. Barnes, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976), which held that the earning capacity of the
claimant wife could not be considered in determining whether she was entitled to ali-
mony after divorce.
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 160, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 72, provides in per-
tinent part: "When a spouse has not been at fault and has not sufficient means for sup-
port, the court may allow that spouse, out of the property and earnings of the other
spouse, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his or her income."
9. La. H.B. No. 901, proposed LA. CIv. CODE art. 161, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
.10. 362 So. 2d 1165 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
In last year's symposium, the following cases concerning fault for purposes of ali-
mony after divorce were cited and discussed: Bruner v. Bruner, 364 So. 2d 1015 (La.
1978); Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978); Fulmer v. Fulmer,
301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974); Brannon v. Brannon, 362 So. 2d 1164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978);
Bennett v. Bennett, 349 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Moon v. Moon, 345 So. 2d
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bed and board against her husband on the grounds of cruel treat-
ment and abandonment." The husband reconvened against the wife,
seeking a separation on the basis of cruel treatment. Thereafter, the
wife filed a suit for divorce alleging adultery by the husband. All
three suits were consolidated for trial. The wife was awarded a
divorce on the grounds of the husband's adultery but was denied ali-
mony after divorce because of her fault in causing the separation.
As authority for its legal conclusion, the court analogized the facts
to those in Thomason v. Thomason:m " "The Thomason case is analo-
gous to the facts here presented for the reason that in neither case
had there been a prior adjudication of fault and in the initial pro-
ceedings aimed at dissolution of the marriage the trial court made
an adjudication of mutual fault.""3 However, it seems the analogy is
inappropriate. In Thomason the respective spouse's fault constituted
grounds for divorce. In Brannon the wife was guilty of cruel treat-
ment which is only grounds for separation; and the husband was
guilty of adultery, grounds for divorce.
More apposite as authority and also cited by the court was
Smith v. Smith. 4 In Smith the wife had obtained a divorce on the
grounds of adultery but nonetheless was required to prove her own
lack of fault to claim alimony after divorce. 5 Relying on Smith, the
court in Brannon concluded, "In the event the plaintiff-wife is guilty
of fault, she is not entitled to alimony even though she is entitled to
168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Smith v. Smith, 216 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). See
Persons, supra note 1.
Other cases this term not included in the text discussion were Brocato v. Brocato,
369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 1341 (La. 1979); Laurent v.
Laurent, 369 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 1343 (La. 1979);
Martin v. Lopez, 367 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
11. LA. Civ. CODE art. 138.
12. 355 So. 2d 908 (La. 1978). In Thomason, the wife sought a divorce on the basis
of the conviction and sentence of her spouse to imprisonment at hard labor; the hus-
band reconvened for divorce on grounds of the wife's adultery. After abrogating the
doctrine of recrimination in divorce litigation, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court's finding of mutual fault, and awarded the wife a divorce. However, the
wife was denied alimony on the basis of her mutual fault.
13. 362 So. 2d at 1168.
14. 216 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
15. The rationale of the judge's ruling is that if the wife is granted a divorce on
the grounds of adultery, the husband cannot contend she is guilty of fault barring
alimony.
We think the trial judge was in error.
We see nothing in our construction of Article 160 which is absurd or which is
inconsistent with the traditional principle of our law that only the wife who has
not been at fault shall be entitled to demand alimony after divorce.
Id. at 392-93.
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a divorce because of her husband's adultery.""6 Yet, Smith was a
case decided well before the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in
Fulmer v. Fulmer,'? which held that a determination of fault at the
separation proceedings was conclusive of the issue of fault for pur-
poses of alimony after divorce. The Smith decision was also prior to
Thomason, in which the supreme court made the following state-
ment in a footnote:
In Fulmer v. Fulmer, we held that the determination of fault
in a separation proceeding is conclusive of pre-separation fault
and cannot be relitigated. To the same effect, determination of
fault in a proceeding for immediate divorce is conclusive for pur-
poses of permanent alimony following divorce. Thus, neither
party in the instant suit would be entitled to alimony."8
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Smith was overruled by the
language of Fulmer and Thomason.9
In Bell v. Bell" the Second Circuit Court of Appeal again con-
cluded that the wife who had obtained a divorce from her husband
on the grounds of adultery was not relieved of proving her lack of
fault for purposes of alimony after divorce.21 Smith was cited as
authority. To distinguish statements made in Fulmer22 and Thoma-
son23 regarding determination of fault in a divorce proceeding, the
court emphasized that the wife in Bell had not requested alimony in
her suit against the defendant for divorce. The distinction is tenu-
ous; in Fulmer, where fault was adjudicated for purposes of separa-
tion from bed and board, there was no present claim of the wife for
alimony after divorce. Probably in recognition of the questionable
distinction in facts, the court concluded that Smith had been unaf-
fected by Fulmer and Thomason: "Smith . . . was discussed with ap-
proval in Bruner .... which was a later decision than Fulmer ... and
Thomason.... We are therefore of the opinion the rule of Smith ... is
viable and is applicable in this situation.' Smith was discussed ap-
provingly in Bruner v. Bruner 5 as authority for the proposition that
"for the wife to be entitled to post-divorce alimony our law requires
16. 362 So. 2d at 1168.
17. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
18. 355 So. 2d at 912 n.8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thomason involved
mutual fault.
19. For further discussion, see Persons, supra note 1, at 667-68.
20. 368 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
21. Id at 780.
22. 301 So. 2d at 629.
23. 355 So. 2d at 912 n.8.
24. 368 So. 2d at 780.
25. 364 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1978).
[Vol. 40
19801 WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979 547
that she be free from fault both prior to the separation judgment
and prior to the divorce."26 Whether citing Smith for the foregoing
proposition constitutes supreme court approval of the legal result in
Smith is difficult to determine. If it does, the decisions in Fulmer,
Thomason, and Bruner seem inconsistent.
The author speculated in last year's symposium' about the ef-
fect of a judgment of separation awarded to a spouse less at fault
than the other. By invoking the doctrine of comparative rectitude,
which compares the spouses' respective faults, the spouse less at
fault should be awarded the separation. It was the opinion of the
author that comparative rectitude had been neither legislatively
overruled in separation suits" nor judicially abrogated in divorce
suits.' The purpose of Civil Code article 141, overruling recrimina-
tion as a defense in separation suits, was remedial. The article's pur-
pose was to provide relief for a spouse who could not obtain a
separation because of the application of the doctrine of recrimina-
tion. That the doctrine of comparative rectitude has also been over-
ruled does not necessarily follow. Article 141 was unnecessary as a
remedy in separation suits in which the faults of the spouses were
not equal in degree or seriousness. If a separation judgment were
rendered on the basis of invoking comparative rectitude, arguably
the successful spouse should be considered not at fault for purposes
of alimony after divorce. Language to support such a conclusion can
be found in Fulmer. Additionally, the same result obtains in a some-
what analogous situation, the application of comparative negligence
statutes. The most popular comparative negligence system permits
recovery if the plaintiff's negligence was not equal to or greater
than that of the defendant."0 In light of Planiol's expression that the
26. Id. at 1019.
27. Persons, supra note 1, at 668.
28. LA. CiV. CODE art. 141, as amended by 1976 La. Acts, No. 495, provides: "A
separation from bed and board shall be granted although both spouses are mutually at
fault in causing the separation. In such instances, alimony pendente lite may be
allowed but permanent alimony shall not be allowed thereafter following divorce."
29. Thomason v. Thomason, 355 So. 2d 908 (La. 1978). By discussing the respective
faults of the spouses in Thomason, the implication was that it is proper for a court to
weigh and compare the offenses of the spouses in determining against whom the judg-
ment shall be rendered.
We do not agree that the commission of adultery is the greater fault, under all
circumstances. As with nearly all absolutes, such a rule is both unnecessary and
unreasonable. To the extent that J.F.C. v. M.E. and Abshire v. Hanks ....
stand for that proposition, they are overruled.
We cannot say from the record before us that Mrs. Thomason's having taken
up residence with another man nine months after her husband was incarcerated is
any more serious than his having committed a robbery.
Id. at 911.
30. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (1966).
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philosophical source of article 160's concern with fault"1 is the princi-
ple embodied in article 231532 and the legislature's enactment of a
comparative negligence statute in 1979,"3 the analogy is apt and in
accord with at least some of the current notions of comparative
fault.
Despite the foregoing rationale, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peal concluded that article 141 abrogated not only the doctrine of
recrimination, but also that of comparative rectitude. In Brocato v.
Brocato34 the court stated: "We doubt very seriously that the legisla-
ture by the adoption of Article 141 in 1976 had in mind the technical
distinction between the theory of recrimination and the theory of
comparative rectitude and more particularly the weighing process
required of the court under the latter theory."3 The court's conclu-
sion concerning comparative rectitude is probably dictum; based
upon the evidence, the spouses were apparently guilty of "equal"
31. 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 1, no. 1259, at 696-97 (11th ed. La. St.
L. Inst. trans. 1959). Planiol states:
The community of life permitted the spouse without means to share the welfare
of the other. Suddenly through no fault of the spouse in question, he or she finds
himself or herself devoid of resources and plunged into poverty. It is manifestly in
such a case as this that the guilty party should be made to bear the consequences
of his wrong act.
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315 provides in pertinent part: "Every act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it."
33. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431. Louisiana's comparative negligence statute differs
from those cited in note 30, supra. Under Act 431, Civil Code articles 2103 and 2323
were amended to read as follows:
Art. 2103. When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether the obliga-
tion arises from a contract, a quasi-contract, an offense, or a quasi-offense, the
debt shall be divided between them. If the obligation arises from a contract or a
quasi-contract, each debtor is liable for his virile portion. If the obligation arises
from an offense or a quasi-offense, it shall be divided in proportion to each
debtor's fault.
A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary may
seek to enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary co-debtor by making
him a third party defendant in the suit, as provided in Article 1111 through 1116
of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether or not the third party defendant was
sued by the plaintiff initially, and whether the defendant seeking to enforce con-
tribution if he is cast admits or denies liability on the obligation sued on by the
plaintiff.
Art. 2323. When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages,
its effect shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury, death or loss as the result
partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person
or persons, the claim for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount
of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percen-
tage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death or loss.
34. 369 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 1341 (La. 1979).
35. Id. at 1086.
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fault." In addition to the rationale offered by the court, its decision
can be sustained on the basis that comparative rectitude was devel-
oped solely to ameliorate the doctrine of recrimination. If the doc-
trine of recrimination is legislatively abrogated, there is no basis for
further application of the doctrine of comparative rectitude.
Although the courts of appeal decisions, reflecting their concern
with the legal technicalities of fault, appear to support elimination of
fault as an absolute bar, there are more persuasive arguments. Pre-
occupation with fault for purposes of alimony after divorce was
based upon the principle that whatever act of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it."2 Historically, alimony was an indemnity awarded to the spouse
who, through no fault of his own, had been wronged or damaged by
the other." Current notions of the foundations of the alimony obliga-
tion do not correspond to its historical basis. 9 Therefore, if one con-
siders alimony as "socio-economic legislation"'" which provides
support for those in need by exacting it from those who have pro-
vided similar maintenance in the past,'1 then fault should not be a
condition to its award.
With increased knowledge about the various causes of failure of
a marriage, a finding of fault on the part of only one spouse does not
accord with reality; rarely does a marital relationship dissolve
because one spouse alone was at fault. Furthermore, fault has
become an economic issue because of Fulmer and its progeny; it is
litigated in suits for separation from bed and board. Accusations
concerning the wrongdoing of the other spouse have become finan-
cially imperative, the result being an unfortunate focus on the sepa-
ration proceedings. A spouse frequently cannot afford to forego the
opportunity to accuse and prove the other guilty of serious fault. By
making separation fault an economic issue, the legislative policy to
encourage reconciliation after a separation judgment'" is under-
36. "It is difficult to determine which of the above acts of misconduct on the part
of one caused or brought on the wrongful and retaliatory conduct of the other." Id at
1087.
37. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2315.
38. See note 31, supra.
39. In Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978) (on original hearing),
Justice Dennis described alimony after divorce as follows: "However, it would appear
that the underlying practical reason for alimony is to provide support for those who
need it, with a minimal amount of social dislocation, by extracting it from those who
have provided similar maintenance in the past." Id at 308 n.12.
40. Justice Barham described alimony after divorce as socio-economic legislation
in Montz v. Montz, 253 La. 897, 907, 221 So. 2d 40, 44 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
41. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 119-20.
42. LA. R.S. 9:302 (Supp. 1977). Judge Beer has had occasion to comment on the
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mined. It is unreasonable to expect spouses, after making public ac-
cusations about each other, to reconcile their differences. The
French, who originally considered alimony as a type of indemnity,
have eliminated fault entirely from alimony considerations.'3 If the
legislature is reluctant to eliminate fault entirely, a compromise sug-
gestion would be its elimination as an absolute bar to alimony and
the retention of fault as a discretionary factor.
PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY-CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 184
The presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of
a child born or conceived during marriage" continues to be assaulted
by the jurisprudence. In Warren v. Richard'5 and Succession of
Mitchell," the Louisiana Supreme Court admitted evidence estab-
lishing biological paternity even though the child was conclusively
presumed under state law to be the issue of another man. In War-
ren the court relied upon a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions'7 as compelling the admission of evidence" of biological
paternity. The legislative history of Civil Code article 198" was
relied upon by the court in Mitchell to permit the legitimation by
subsequent marriage of children presumed those of the husband of
the mother, thus legitimate. In both cases the court confused two
distinct, yet interrelated, processes described by this author else-
where" as filiation and classification.
judiciary's preoccupation with fault and to urge its elimination in Hingle v. Hingle, 369
So. 2d 271, 272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (Beer, J., concurring); Dixon v. Dixon, 357 So.
2d 856, 858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (Beer, J., concurring); Clary v. Clary, 341 So. 2d
628, 629 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (Beer, J., concurring).
43. C. civ. arts. 278 to 280-1. These articles are described in Audit, Recent-Revi-
sions of the French Civil Code, 38 LA. L. REV. 747, 776 (1978). See note 42, supra.
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 184 provides: "The husband of the mother is presumed to
be the father of all children born or conceived during the marriage."
45. 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
46. 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975).
47. 296 So. 2d at 816-17, citing Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
48. [In Warren,] [tihe Supreme Court granted certiorari and received a record
which contained by way of relevant evidence (1) a birth certificate and prior tutor-
ship proceedings on behalf of the child, both of which indicated that the child was
the biological issue of decedent, and (2) affidavits alleging that the child's mother
was married to a man other than the decedent at the time the child was born.
Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenge& Speculations on Warren v.
Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59, 73 n.37 (1976).
49. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, provides:
"Illegitimate children are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father, and
mother, whenever the latter have formally or informally acknowledged them as their
children, either before or after the marriage."
50. Spaht & Shaw, supra note 48.
[Vol. 40
1980] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979 551
Filiation, for purposes of this article, is defined as "the act of fix-
ing paternity, that is, of identifying a specific man as the biological
father of a specific child."'" Consequently, filiation's main concern is
with proof: what sort of evidence is required to prove the identity of
the father to the satisfaction of the trier of fact. The mechanism
created by law as a solution to problems of proving legitimate filia-
tion and as a means of avoiding clumsy case-by-case adjudication
was the presumption contained in article 184.52 In summary, filiation
has as its purpose the identification of a father-child relationship
existing between two specific persons.
Classification, on the other hand, is defined as "the process of
arranging persons in, or assigning persons to, either the class of
legitimate children or the class of illegitimate children.", As pre-
viously stated by this author, "[tihe purpose of classification is to
provide a vehicle for regulation of the parent-child relationship, that
is, for identifying the rights and obligations which parents incur by
the birth of their children .... It may be said, then, that the impor-
tance of classification derives from its effects, that is, the legal con-
sequences which the legislator chooses to attach the status."'
Classification is made "according to a three-step method prescribed
by the Civil Code: (1) identify the mother, (2) identify the father, (3)
determine date of conception."55 Filiation and classification are ob-
viously interrelated in that identification of the father is one step in
the codal method for classification of children. Filiation, which fixes
paternity, is precedent to and has an effect on classification.
The distinction is important because what has concerned the
United States Supreme Court constitutionally is not the filiation
process, but the effects of the classification as either legitimate or
illegitimate. Yet, in Warren and in Mitchell, the effects of classifica-
tion were not at issue; the children were not deprived of rights
because they were illegitimate. The children in both cases were
legitimate. At issue was the process of filiation imposed upon the
child by state law. In both cases, following prior jurisprudence, the
court found that the children were not entitled to claim certain
rights because the alleged biological father was not, in the eyes of
the law, the father.
The impact of both Warren and Mitchell was to create problems
in application, because the conclusiveness of the presumption of article
51. Id at 63.
52. See note 44, supra.
53. Spaht & Shaw, supra note 48, at 62.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 63.
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184 was destroyed without being replaced by a substitute standard
for proving paternity. After examining both decisions, it is sug-
gested that the Louisiana Supreme Court implicitly held, in startling
contrast to prior jurisprudence,
(1) that a class of persons, undefined but certainly including per-
sons other than the husband or his heirs, may rebut the pre-
sumption of Article 184, (2) without any apparent time limits
within which they must act, (3) by meeting an undefined stan-
dard of proof which is in any event less rigorous than that re-
quired for an action en desaveu
As was predicted by this author previously, "[a] logical extension of
[Warren and] Mitchell would open [an] alternative avenue of filiation
(1) to any interested party (2) in any situation in which the existence
of a father-child relationship is pertinent."57
In Interest of Poche58 a child presumed that of the husband of
the mother under article 1851" was allowed to recover support from
her biological father. The proof offered of biological paternity was
the mother's testimony, defendant's malpractice suit naming the
child as his, his attendance at her baptism, his acknowledgment of
the daughter in depositions and interrogatories, his tendering of
child support payments, and his payment of medical and hospital
bills. Acknowledging no direct authority, only a developing trend,
Judge Garrison quoted the following language from Warren:
It was in reliance upon these U.S. Supreme Court decisions that the
Louisiana Supreme Court determined in Warren v. Richard... that
it was not necessary to determine to which class of illegimate
filiation the child belonged. It sufficed to simply determine that
the child was in fact the biological child of the alleged father.
The fact that the law considered the child to be the legitimate
child of another will not alter the result and cannot deprive her
of a right which illegitimate children generally may have . . .0
The judiciary in Warren, Mitchell, and Poche recognized that
the presumption existed and that, until disavowed by the husband of
the mother, the child could be considered legally the child of one
father and biologically the child of another. Yet, in the Louisiana
Supreme Court decision of Tenneco Oil Co. v. Houston,61 in a concur-
56. Id. at 78.
57. Id. at 79.
58. 368 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 577 (La. 1979).
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 provides in pertinent part: "A child born less than
three hundred days after the dissolution of the marriage is presumed to have been
conceived during the marriage."
60. 368 So. 2d at 176-77.
61. 372 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1979).
[Vol. 40
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sus proceeding to determine ownership of mineral royalties, evi-
dence was introduced to establish a biological father-child relation-
ship, resulting in a rebuttal of the presumption of paternity under
article 184. The children were born during the existence of a legal
marriage, the result of an adulterous connection of their mother
with a man other than the husband. Subsequent to their birth, the
mother married the biological father of her children without divorc-
ing her husband. The court concluded that the children were illegiti-
mate because they were born of an adulterous connection. Issues
raised by the facts, although not discussed in the majority opinion,"
included the following: the good or bad faith of the second husband,
civil effects in favor of the good faith putative spouse and children
of the marriage,"3 legitimation of the children by the subsequent
putative marriage of parents, ' jurisprudence holding that the pre-
sumption of paternity under article 184 applies to the legal husband
when a second marriage is contracted in bad faith, 5 and constitu-
tional issues concerning discrimination in succession law between
legitimate and illegitimate children." All of the issues mentioned, ex-
cept the last, were raised in the brief by counsel representing the
children. The effect of Tenneco Oil Co. is more far-reaching than its
predecessors, since in Warren and Mitchell the court did not con-
sider the presumption of paternity of the husband of the mother
rebutted legally by evidence establishing different biological pater-
nity. Even though Tenneco Oil Co. will be cited in the future as a
significant property law decision, 7 its import for Louisiana family
law is a change in the rules by which paternity is fixed.
62. Some of the issues mentioned are discussed in the dissenting opinion authored
by Justice Tate. 372 So. 2d at 1196-97.
63. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 117-18.
64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198. See also R. PASCAL & K. SPAHT, LOUISIANA FAMILY
LAW COURSE 330 (2d ed. 1979).
65. Burrell v. Burrell, 154 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
66. See, e.g., Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979); Succession of
Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977). See also Note, All in the Family: Equal Protection
and the Illegitimate Child in Louisiana Succession Law, 38 LA. L. REV. 189 (1977)
(cited in Tenneco Oil Co.).
67. Writs were granted in Tenneco Oil Co. to consider the correctness of the hold-
ing of the court of appeal that all the claimants traced their title back to a common
author; relying upon Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974), the appellate
court found that "proof of a more ancient title derived from a common author in title is
not proof of ownership, that is, title good against the world, but merely proof of better
title." 372 So. 2d at 1195, quoting Tenneco Oil Co. v. Houston, 364 So. 2d 1056 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1978). The property issue was avoided by a finding that all of the claim-
ants did not trace title back to a common author because the Harp group of claimants
were illegitimate.
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ADOPTION -CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS
Confidentiality of adoption records has had a varied legislative
history. The emphasis of policy concerns surrounding restricted access
to adoption records has shifted through the years from protection of
the child and adoptive parents from contact with the biological
parents 8 to protection of biological parents from contact with the
child." In 1977 the statute governing the opening of the sealed pack-
age which contains the original birth certificate and the certificate
of the decree of adoption was amended"0 to allow the adopted child
access only "for compelling reasons and only to the extent necessary
to satisfy such compelling necessity."" Presumably, the amendment
restricted access by the adopted child in an effort to insulate the
parents from later discovery by the child. Furthermore, to ac-
complish this policy, the legislature amended the provision in 1978
to authorize the appointment of a curator ad hoc for the purpose of
determining the extent to which access to the records may be neces-
sary.72 In the same year, the legislature mandated retroactive appli-
cation of the statute.
In examining the concern for protection of the parents' identity
from the child, it is apparent that the amendment was intended to
promote the surrender of children for adoption. This result would
most frequently occur in cases of infant children born out of wed-
lock. With abortion as a legal and sometimes uncomplicated alterna-
tive7 to the birth of an illegitimate child, insulating the biological
parent from future contact with the child could make adoption a
more attractive alternative. Judge Redmann rather accurately de-
scribed the legislation as the product of the anti-abortion, pro-
68. LA. R.S. 40:81 (Supp. 1978); 1950 La. Acts, No. 316, § 11; 1950 La. Acts, Ex.
Sess., No. 2, § 1; 1926 La. Acts, No. 228, §§ 2 & 4. For a discussion of the legislative
history of confidentiality of adoption records, see Kirsch v. Parker, 375 So. 2d 693, 694
n.2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
69. LA. R.S. 40:81(A) (Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part: "This sealed package
may be opened only on the order of a competent court either upon its own motion, or
upon the demand of the adopted child or the adoptive parent, or the state registrar,
for compelling reasons and only to the extent necessary to satisfy such compelling
necessity."
70. 1977 La. Acts, No. 659, amending LA. R.S. 40:81 (Supp. 1976).
71. LA. R.S. 40:81 (Supp. 1976), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 659.
72. LA. R.S. 40:81(A) (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 450, § 2, pro-
vides in pertinent part: "In satisfying the requirement that information shall be re-
vealed only to the extent necessary to satisfy the compelling necessity shown, the
court is authoriied to use the services of a curator-ad-hoc appointed pursuant to Arti-
cle 5091.2 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure."
73. 1978 La. Acts, No. 450, § 2, amending LA. R.S. 40:80 (Supp. 1976).
74. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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adoption forces."5 Despite what appear to be the most laudable of
goals-i.e., encouraging adoption, discouraging abortion-the statute
as amended presents problems in its application.
In Massey v. Parker"' the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the
statute retroactively to a suit which had already been tried. The
child who had been adopted in 1947 sought court-ordered access to
the sealed package containing his original birth certificate. Amici
curiae briefs were filed on behalf of Associated Catholic Charities of
New Orleans, Inc.; Adoptive Couples Together, Inc.; and New
Orleans Right to Life Association.77 In interpreting the statute, as
amended, the court opined, "[t]he legislature has indicated that, even
when a 'compelling necessity' is found, there are other factors which
must be considered in determining to what extent information con-
tained in sealed records will be disclosed."78 Recognizing that the
right to inherit from biological parents" may constitute a compelling
reason, the court concluded that the reason is only compelling if
there are present inheritance rights. To determine whether there
are such inheritance rights, there is no compelling necessity for the
child to see the sealed records, "but there is a compelling reason for
the court to examine the records."'"
In Massey the court remanded the case for the appointment of a
curator ad hoc to examine the sealed records and assist the court in
determining whether "there are any inheritance rights which pres-
ently exist."'" If there are, "then the court shall have to determine a
means by which plaintiff's rights may be assured, giving full con-
sideration to protecting the confidentiality which may have been
guaranteed to the blood parent or parents."8 This language from the
decision reflects a sensitivity in the balancing of the rights and in-
terests of both the biological parents83 and the adopted child.'
Although not mentioned specifically, the court may have also been
75. Kirsch v. Parker, 375 So. 2d 693, 694 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
76. 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1314.
79. LA. CIv. CODE art. 214.
80. 369 So. 2d at 1314 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 1315.
82. Id.
83. See Comment, Confidentiality of Adoption Records: An Examination, 52 TUL.
L. REV. 817, 832-35 (1978) (discussing the possibility of the biological parents' constitu-
tional right to privacy and, if such a right exists, its "knowing" waiver).
84. LA. CIv. CODE art, 214. For a discussion of confidentiality of adoption records,
see Comment, supra note 83. The author of the Comment explores the adopted child's
right or psychological need to know the identity of his biological parents and whether
the need to know is "good cause." Id. at 845-52.
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considering the effects of such litigation and subsequent revelations
upon the adoptive parents.
In the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Tate, problems in
the use of a curator ad hoc to determine the extent necessary to
open the sealed records were examined. The curator, often perfunc-
torily appointed at a low fee, must determine "at a given point in
time"" whether the child has any present inheritance rights from
his biological parents. If there are present inheritance rights, the
curator must determine what they are, which may also be difficult
in light of the effects of recent constitutional decisions upon Loui-
siana's succession law." If there are no present inheritance rights,
presumably the child must bring suit periodically so that the issue
may be reinvestigated to "vindicate his inheritance rights protected
for him by our law."8 According to Justice Tate,
[T]he compelling need of the child to know his own parents, both
for economic reasons of inheritance and for the emotional sense
of wholeness with the past to which all individuals should be en-
titled, will always outweigh the interest of the blood parents in
hiding their parentage from the child.8
A recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal decision refused to
retroactively apply Massey or the amended statute to a child sur-
rendered for adoption in 1947 at the age of three. The child was
seeking access to her original birth certificate. The rationale of the
court of appeal in Kirsch v. Parker ' was that the 1978 legislation,
making the provisions of the, statute governing access to the adop-
tion records retroactive, did, not apply to the adoption of a three-
year-old child. According to the court, the older child had already
had "a significant history of conscious life before its adoption";" and,
at the time the plaintiff child was adopted, there was a "lack of seal-
ing against the parties."" As additional justification for the rationale
of Kirsch, Judge Redmann concluded that to interpret the statute as
retroactive would result in a denial of liberty without due process of
law" and a denial of equal protection of the law." Judge Redmann in
dicta opined that the liberty involved was
85. 369 So. 2d at 1316 (Tate, J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 726 (1976); Succession of Thompson, 367
So. 2d 796 (La. 1979); Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
87. 369 So. 2d at 1316 (Tate, J., dissenting).
88. I& (Emphasis added.)
89. 375 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 697.
91. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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the freedom to relive one's past, to return to childhood scenes,
to retrace one's consciously lived history, in addition to the
liberty perhaps claimable by all adoptees to know the identity of
one's parents and blood family tree and to have access to state-
kept vital statistics records of one's self and one's family that
are open to every non-adopted person."
The language utilized by Judge Redmann concerning a constitu-
tional right of adoptees to trace their identity is reminiscent of that
used by Justice Tate in his dissenting opinion in Massey.
Consistently, the courts have recognized that the determination
of present inheritance rights is a "compelling reason." Accepting the
desirability of the policy sought to be accomplished in the "pro-adop-
tion, anti-abortion legislation,""9 the policy could be further strength
ened by eliminating the child's right to inherit from his biological
parents." The right of the child to inherit did not exist before 1948,"7
and it is unnecessary as a protection for the adopted child. If
adopted, the child is considered as a legitimate child and forced heir
of the adoptive parents. He is not being denied inheritance rights; in
fact, he enjoys more generous inheritance rights than other chil-
dren. With increasing speculation as to the constitutionality of Loui-
siana's succession laws,98 it has become more difficult to determine
the extent of an illegitimate's succession rights. As difficulties in
proving the paternity of an illegitimate child who was adopted are
presented, the determination of inheritance rights of an adopted
child will become increasingly burdensome. Eliminating the right to
inherit from the biological parents would remove it as a "compelling
reason" for access to confidential adoption records. Instead, proof of
some strong psychological need to discover one's identity" or medi-
cal necessity would be required as proof of a "compelling reason." In
the case of medical necessity, it would be appropriate and not too
difficult for a curator ad hoc to determine the extent to which access
to the records should be allowed to satisfy the compelling reasons."'
94. 375 So. 2d at 699 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 694 n.2.
96. LA. Civ. CODE art. 214.
97. For a legislative history of Civil Code article 214, which allows adopted
children the right to inherit from their biological parents, see 1972 COMPILED EDITION
OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 214 (J. Dainow ed.). The statutory language giv-
ing adopted children the right to inherit was added to article 214 by Act 454 of 1948.
98. See note 86, supra.
99. See note 84, supra.
100. See Comment, supra note 83, at 844-45. A suggested approach of the author of
the Comment is that "[mledical information concerning biological parents and adoptees
should be disclosed to adoptees on request with identifying information about the
biological parents deleted." Id. at 853.
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If discovering one's identity is alleged as the "compelling reason,"
substantial proof should be required of the "psychological need." A
repeal of the inheritance rights accorded an adopted child to the
estate of his biological parents is consistent with the policy of pro-
tecting the anonymity of the parents and terminating permanently
the relationship of parent-child which existed by nature.
